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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD SECURITY COMMITTEE

Compartmentation Subcommittee

SECOM/CS-D3-75 30 May 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, USIB Security Committee

SUBJECT : DCID 1/7, Control of Dissemination of

Foreign Intelligence

1. At the one hundred seventeenth meeting of the Security Committee, on 18 March 1975, you remanded a prior draft version of DCID 1/7, subject: Control of Dissemination of Foreign Intelligence, to the Compartmentation Subcommittee to attempt to resolve several outstanding issues.

- 2. Attached (TAB A) is a revised draft (No. 7) which has been agreed to by all Subcommittee membership excepting the National Security Agency. The NSA disagreement relates specifically to subparagraph 5 a.(5) which concerns the "NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS" marking, and their position with respect to this matter is attached as TAB B. The balance of the Subcommittee is of the opinion that the alternate marking, "NO FOREIGN DISSEM", suggested by NSA and in current use, does not on its face reflect the total extent of the intended restriction, and leaves room for misinterpretation.
- 3. The Subcommittee also has a separate proposal to make related to subparagraph 4d of that draft, which reads:

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Any department or agency disseminating foreign intelligence beyond the departments and agencies of the USIB shall be responsible for ensuring that recipient departments and agencies understand and agree to observe the restrictions prescribed by this directive and maintain adequate safeguards.

While recognizing the increasing demand for foreign intelligence which by its nature is intended for dissemination outside what has traditionally been considered the U.S. intelligence community, the Subcommittee is aware of attendant security risks. opinion of the Subcommittee, these risks stem principally from the failure to identify central referents within the non-USIB departments and agencies with whom the USIB departments could appropriately liaise to ensure the maintenance of adequate security safeguards. It is the recommendation of the Subcommittee, therefore, that the Director of Central Intelligence formally address the heads of all non-USIB departments and agencies receiving foreign intelligence, with a request that they identify senior intelligence officials to act on their behalf on all matters involving liaison with the U.S. intelligence community. The list of these senior intelligence officials would be published periodically for the benefit of Board members.

4. It is recommended that draft No.7 of DCID 1/7 (including NSA's dissenting position) and the proposal set forth in paragraph 3, above, be scheduled for discussion at an early Security Committee Meeting.

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Chairman	

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